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LIST ALL PARTIES

The Appellant is listed as shown on the heading. Keystone Conversions, LLC will
be referred to hereinafter as "Keystone." The Appellee is listed as shown on the heading.
The Washington County Water Conservancy District will be referred to hereinafter as the
"District."
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IV,

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(3).
V,

ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The following three issues pertain to the Trial Court's Judgment and the Trial
Court's denial of Keystone's Motion to Alter Judgment:
1.

Is the fee collected by Toquerville on behalf of the District a fee collected

as a "condition of development approval" within the meaning of the Impact Fee Statute?
2.

In an action for declaratory relief, especially given the broad request by the

District, may the Trial Court assume facts and probable scenarios; and therefore, did the
Trial Court err in denying Keystone's Motion to Alter Judgment?
3.

Did the Trial Court err in failing to award Keystone its attorney's fees and

costs when Keystone was the prevailing party before the Trial Court, and given that Utah
Code Ann. § 11-36-401(5) allows an award for fees and costs?
The first two issues are issues of law. Factual scenarios were assumed by the Trial
Court given the declaratory nature of the District's request. The standard for appellate
review of legal issues is correctness. See Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097
(Utah 1995). This Court must determine whether the Trial Court properly assumed
factual scenarios given the declaratory nature of this matter. This is likewise an issue of
law, and the standard of review is one of correctness. Board of Educ. of Alpine School

Dist. v. Ward, 1999 UT 17 | 8 , 974 P.2d 824, 825. No evidentiary hearing was held.
Accordingly, the facts relied upon by the Trial Court were either stipulated or assumed as
probable scenarios given the arguments of the parties and the declaratory relief requested
by them. R. 221. Again, this Court must determine whether the Trial Court properly
assumed certain scenarios given the record before it and the stamp of approval requested
by the District.
The third issue on appeal involves a challenge to the discretionary ruling of the
Trial Court. The standard of review for such a challenge is abuse of discretion.
Crookson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
VI.

GOVERNING AUTHORITY

Utah Code Ann. §11-36-101 et seq.; Banberry Development Corp v. South Jordan
City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).
VII.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW

This case deals with a "water availability fee" imposed by the District in providing
secondary water to developers in areas near the Town of LaVerkin and the Town of
Toquerville (hereinafter "Toquerville").
The District filed a Petition in the Fifth District Court seeking a determination and
declaration that the Final Rules and Regulations for Secondary Retail Water Service for
the La Verkin Creek Area do not impose impact fees under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101

et seq. and that the Rules are within the power of the District and constitute a valid act
pursuant to a valid proceeding of the District. R. 1-30.1
The next day, Keystone filed a Complaint in the Fifth District Court seeking a
declaration that the District's water availability fee is an impact fee subject to the Impact
Fee Act as found in Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq. See Addendum No. 1; see also
generally, Keystone's Trial Memorandum. R. 55-126.
The Trial Court consolidated the District's Petition and Keystone's Complaint into
one action. R. 35-36. The Trial Court held a hearing and entered a Stipulation and Order
limiting the hearing "to address only the legal question of whether or not the fee imposed
by the Washington County Water Conservancy District as part of its Rules adopted July
17, 2001, is or is not an impact fee" and left all remaining issues to be addressed at a later
date.R. 145-146.
The Trial Court issued a Ruling, finding that the District's fee is an impact fee
under the Impact Fee Act, as Keystone sought. R. 182-196. However, the Trial Court
rejected the argument that a $5,522 per one-acre lot—See R. 24—water use fee collected
by Toquerville was collected as a condition of development approval and was an impact
fee. R. 194-195. The Court analogized this fee to a fee paid by a contractor to the state
for a license. R. 194, n.3. According to the Court, such a fee has no relation to the fee
paid, for example, when that same contractor took out a building permit. Id.
1

Keystone had difficulty following the Trial Court's numbering of the record and
apologizes to this Court for the confusion.

The Trial Court then entered Judgment against the District, incorporating its
earlier Ruling. R. 197-198. Keystone filed a Motion to Alter Judgment, believing that
the Judgment as written would allow the District to "implement its availability fee
through the cities and towns without complying with the impact fees statute" thus
circumventing the intent of the Impact Fees Act. R. 199-280. Keystone demonstrated in
its Memorandum and other exhibits and affidavits supporting its Motion to Alter
Judgment that the District was likely to do that very thing. R. 237, 241, 242, 269, 270,
300-304. Keystone's Motion to Alter Judgment was denied. R. 318. The Trial Court
then certified its ruling as final under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). R. 394-397. Keystone now
appeals. R. 416, 417.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

The District constructed, owns, and manages a secondary water system

which supplies secondary irrigation water to residents of Toquerville, and is capable of
providing wholesale irrigation water to areas in the towns of La Verkin and Toquerville
known as the "LaVerkin Creek Area." R. 1-30; R. 2, % 5; R. 112, 116.
2.

In mid May 2001, the District announced in the local St. George newspaper

that it was planning to hold a public hearing on its proposed new impact fee of $3,000.00
per lot in the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System, the hearing to be held on June 12, 2001.
This system includes Keystone's property in Toquerville. R. 69-70.
3.

Keystone requested more information regarding the proposed impact fee

and the District's capital facilities plan on which the fee was based. See Addendum No.
1, at 2,^6.
4.

In response to Keystone's request, the District produced a two-page Draft

Capital Facilities Plan and a three-page Impact Fee Analysis for the LaVerkin Creek
Irrigation System, both dated May 23, 2001. R. 71-72, 74-77.
5.

The District also produced a proposed Resolution "approving a capital

facilities plan and imposing development impact fees and charges." R. 79-81.
6.

Keystone objected to the District's impact fee proposal both before and at a

public hearing on June 12, 2001, noting that the District failed to meet procedural notice
requirements for the same, and the enactment failed to meet the statutory criteria required
of a capital facilities plan and impact fee analysis. R. 82-87. The District then postponed
any decision on its plans until its July 17, 2001 meeting.
7.

At the July 17, 2001 meeting, the District for the first time claimed that the

proposed fee for the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System was not an impact fee subject to
the impact fee statute at all, but was a "water availability fee" instead. R. 91-93.
8.

The District produced a new analysis, not previously made available to the

public but which was similar to the impact fee analysis dated May 23, 2001, that it had
previously produced, which sought to establish a fee of $5,522.00 per developed acre. R.
24, 26-30, 74-77.

The fee was actually $5,522 per one-acre lot. R. 24.

9.

In spite of Keystone's continuing objections, the District's Board voted to

adopt the fees as part of a new set of District rules for the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation
System. R. 91-93.
10.

On August 15, 2001, the District filed a Petition in the Fifth District Court

seeking a declaration that the Final Rules and Regulations for Secondary Retail Water
Service for the LaVerkin Creek Area, as amended on July 17, 2001, do not impose
impact fees under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et secj. and that the Rules are within the
power of the District and constitute a valid act pursuant to a valid proceeding of the
District. R. 4.
11.

On August 16, 2001, Keystone filed a Complaint in the Fifth District Court

seeking a declaration, under two separate scenarios, that the District's water availability
fee is an impact fee subject to the Impact Fee Act. Addendum No. 1, ^ 40 n. 7, If 43.
Keystone also sought a declaration that in the event the fee is not an impact fee, that the
fee still be declared void because the District had failed to meet the legal requirement that
all connection and standby fees be reasonable. In the alternative, Keystone sought an
order that the District return all water rights and easements it obtained from Keystone in
order to allow Keystone to install its own independent secondary water distribution
system. Finally, Keystone sought its attorney's fees. See Addendum No. 1.
12.

On September 18, 2002, the Fifth District Court consolidated the District's

Petition and Keystone's Complaint into one action. R. 35, 36.

13.

On October 18, 2001, the Trial Court held a hearing and entered a

Stipulation and Order limiting the hearing "to address only the legal question of whether
or not the fee imposed by the Washington County Water Conservancy District as part of
its Rules adopted July 17, 2001, is or is not an impact fee" and left all remaining issues to
be addressed at a later date. R. 145-146, 357.
14.

On January 15, 2002, the Trial Court issued a Ruling concluding that "the

availability fee imposed by the District's Final Rules is an impact fee under the Impact
Fees Act." The Trial Court did not specifically address Keystone's request for attorney's
fees. R. 182-196.
15.

Although the Trial Court found the District's fee to be an impact fee under

the Impact Fee Act, R. 182-196, the Trial Court ruled that a pass through fee from the
District to Toquerville is not a fee connected to development and that therefore, were the
District to pass its fees through Toquerville onto developers, that would not constitute an
impact fee. R. 194-195.
16.

On September 17, 2002, the Trial Court entered Judgment, determining that

the "initial water availability fee included as part of the [District's] Rules adopted July
17, 2001 is an impact fee pursuant to the statutory definition in Utah Code Ann. § 11-36102." The Trial Court referred to its earlier Ruling of January 15, 2002, and the Ruling
was "incorporated herein by this reference as if fully set forth herein." R. 197-198.
17.

On September 27, 2002, Keystone filed its Motion to Alter Judgment

seeking to have its second scenario — the pass through fee — reconsidered and
determined as an impact fee, believing that the Judgment as written would allow the
District to "implement its availability fee through the cities and towns without complying
with the impact fees statute" thus circumventing the intent of the Impact Fees Act. R.
199-280. In support of Keystone's Motion to Alter Judgment, Keystone submitted the
following to the Trial Court:
A.

An Affidavit of Utah State Senate President L. Alma Mansell, who

was the sponsor of the 1995 Impact Fees Act. R. 228, ^ 2. Senator Mansell stated that if
a city passed through and imposed fees from another governmental entity (such as a
special service district) as a condition of its own development approval, it would be
contrary to and defeat the purpose of the Impact Fee Act if the governmental entity that
originated the fee (the special service district) did not produce a capital facilities plan and
analysis as required by the Impact Fee Act to support that fee. R. 228, f 4.
B.

An Affidavit of Greg Bell, former mayor of Farmington and now a

member of the Utah State Senate, who was a "municipal representative member of the
Impact Fees Act Drafting Committee that drafted the Impact Fees Act in 1995 to
establish the statutory procedure for impact fees in the State of Utah." R. 234, ^ 2. Mr.
Bell stated that his
understanding as a member of the Drafting Committee that the meaning of
the defined terms "impact fee" and "development approval" in the Impact
Fee Act is that an impact fee includes fees imposed by one governmental
entity that are in fact collected by another governmental entity and that are

made a condition of development approval by that second governmental
entity.
R.234,f 3.
C.

An Affidavit by Blain Walker, who "represented the real estate

community as a member of the Impact Fees Act Drafting Committee that drafted the
Impact Fees Act in 1995 to establish the statutory procedure for impact fees in the State
of Utah." R. 288-290. It was Mr. Walker's "intent and understanding as a member of the
Drafting Committee that no impact fees could be imposed by any entity unless that entity
thoroughly and factually demonstrated the need for the fee through compliance with the
Impact Fee Act." R. 289-290,1| i.
D.

A Water Supply Agreement between the District and Toquerville

which requires a $1,500.00 "Water Connection Fee" for each residential connection for
culinary water. R. 241-242, ^| 4.
E.

Toquerville's Subdivision Ordinance which requires that water

"shall be developed and development paid for by the subdivider before a preliminary plat
is approved." R. 270.
F.

An Affidavit of Calvin D. Lowe, a developer who developed a

subdivision in Toquerville. R. 300-301. Mr. Lowe was required to pay a $1,500.00
water fee for each residential lot, a total of $40,500, before he could receive approval for
the final plat of the subdivision. R. 301, f 2; R. 304.
G.

A letter from Ron Thompson, the District's Manager, to

Toquerville, making demand for Mr. Lowe's $40,500 and labeling the fee requested
through Toquerville an "impact. .. fee[]." R. 303.
18.

Keystone's Motion to Alter Judgment was denied on December 10, 2002.

R. 318. The Trial Court's ruling was certified pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). R. 394.
Keystone then brought its appeal to the Utah Supreme Court for further review. R. 416417.
VIII, SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A water availability fee required by the District should be considered an impact
fee, regardless of what the District chooses to call the fee, where the District has a town
collect the fee on its behalf as part of the Town's conditions for final plat approval.
Failing to find such will allow service districts throughout the state to adopt this method
in order to circumvent the Utah State Legislature's passage of Utah Code Ann. § 11-36101 et seq.
Keystone should be awarded its attorney's fees since it was the prevailing party.
The Impact Fee Act authorizes such an award. Furthermore, failing to award Keystone
its attorney's fees will discourage future home owners and developers from challenging
governmental entities that choose to ignore the Impact Fee Act, because they will not
recoup their attorney's fees and costs, even if they prevail on the merits and the Act
provides for such relief.

IX.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE FEE COLLECTED BY TOQUERV1LLE AND PASSED
THROUGH TO THE WATER DISTRICT IS A FEE COLLECTED
AS A "CONDITION OF DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL" WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THE IMPACT FEE STATUTE.

The District claims that it is not bound by the Impact Fee Act when a subdivision
developer pays money to Toquerville for the District's water because the District itself
does not grant subdivision approval.3 No special district for that matter grants
subdivision approvals. If the District's reasoning is sound, why would the legislature
include special districts in its definition of "local political subdivisions" which are subject
to the Impact Fee Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(8)(a). The legislature must have
either had in mind that a special district can require its own development approvals or
that a fee collected by a special district as a result of a city's condition on development
approval is in fact an impact fee. The context of the Impact Fee Act indicates that both
interpretations are correct.
Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-202(8) states that "notwithstanding any other provision
of this i kipter, a local political subdivision may impose and collect impact fees on behalf

3

The District claims that Keystone and others are required by the Toquerville Ordinance to
obtain water from the Toquerville Secondary Water System (TS WS), and consequently
Keystone does not need the District's approval for a secondary water system before
obtaining final plat approval. Although it does not matter which entity ends up with the fee
so long as it is paid as a condition of plat approval, this argument is slight of hand because
the District owns and controls the TSWS. R. 2, f 5; see also Agreement for Joint and
Cooperative Action, dated December 28, 1998, §§5 and 6, a true and correct copy of which
is in the Record. R. 114, 116; see also Resolution adopted by the District on July 17, 2001,
page 1, a true and correct copy of which is in the Record. R. 112.

of a school district if authorized by Section 53A-20-100.5." (emphasis added) This
statute provides an important clarification of the definition of an impact fee because it
plainly states that the body that ultimately receives the fee need not be the same body that
sets the condition on development approval. Hence, it is possible for a fee of one
governmental body to be an impact fee because another governmental body requires its
payment.
Indeed, nothing in the plain language of the statutory definition of an impact fee
requires that the local political subdivision that places conditions on development
approval must be the same body that receives the fee. The plain, simple statutory
definition of an impact fee merely refers to a "condition of development approval" with
no reference to who makes these conditions. The definition is therefore broad enough to
cover development conditions by one governmental body on behalf of another.
An analogy can be made to taxes collected by the county. It is well established
that a county sends out the tax notices, but that the tax imposed includes amounts for
municipalities, school districts and special districts. Just because these other
governmental bodies are not directly involved in requiring payment of the tax does not
mean that they have not imposed a tax that must be paid. Simply put, the meaning of the
term "impact fee" cannot be obscured by the mere fact that more than one governmental
body is involved in bringing about its collection.
The District understands this concept since by contractual agreement cities in

Washington County are required to collect and remit to the District a fee for culinary
water as part of the plat approval from the City. See, e.g., R. 237, 241, 242; see also R.
110. As for secondary water, the District knows that the subdivision ordinances of both
Toquerville and LaVerkin require a secondary water system to be in place as a condition
of development approval. A developer cannot obtain development approval without such
a system, regardless of who is requiring the fee. See, e.g., R. 258, 269, 270. This is the
very reason that the fee analysis drafted by Alpha Engineering, the District's engineer,
states that the "water availability fee for irrigation of $5,522 per developed acre should be
assessed to all developments where service has been committed before the final plat is
recorded." R. 26, 30.
A demonstration of the District's understanding of this principle is found in the
minutes of the Toquerville Town Council meeting of July 8, 1997, in which Mr. Morgan
Jensen of the District presented a proposed contract to Toquerville whereby Toquerville
would purchase culinary water from the District. The contract required that developers
pay a $1,500.00 per lot fee before Toquerville gave plat approval, and some town
officials objected to an up-front fee of this type. The minutes then state that "Mr. Jensen
explained that a Town giving final plat approval is giving a promise of service to the
developer and the fee must be paid as the connection is guaranteed at that time." R. 11011. In this present case, the same principle applies to the District's fee for secondary
water, which must also be paid up front, before development activities can be pursued.

Furthermore, it was error for the Trial Court to find that the District's fee is not an
impact fee because it is only due upon a developer's "request" for water, and that
Toquerville and LaVerkin only require installation of a delivery "system" rather than the
obtaining of actual water. R. 233, 224. First, the Trial Court misunderstood the
ordinances. Toquerville's ordinance, for example, clearly requires that "[e]ach
subdivider shall provide water" as a condition of final plat approval. R. 269, 270.
Second, paragraph 22a of the District's Rules clearly states that "any residential or
commercial developer must request retail water service by [sic] as set forth herein, before
extensions of water mains, fire hydrants, or other waterworks" may be made in his
development. R. 22. Likewise, paragraph 5 of the Rules states that the developer must
pay the fees and apply for water "prior to construction of any intended additions to the
System within the subdivision." R. 10. These paragraphs demonstrate the District's clear
awareness that a request for the actual water is required by District Rules prior to the
mandatory development activity of system installation, and indeed that installing a water
delivery system costing hundreds of thousands of dollars is pointless without water to go
with it.
It is the common understanding in Washington County and throughout Utah that
an impact fee includes fees imposed by a governmental body even when a different
governmental body places a condition on development approval that brings about
collection of the fee. For example, in Washington County the Ash Creek Sewer District

has developed and adopted a capital facilities plan and impact fee analysis knowing foil
well that it is the city and/or county, not Ash Creek itself, that has conditioned
subdivision development tppioval on the mandatorv installation of a sewer system,
which necessarily includes payment of its fees. R. 94-98. While Ash Creek does not
give subdivision plat approvals or building permits, it has recognized that under Utah law
its fee is still an impact fee.
The same is true of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District and Jordan
Valley Water Conservancy District in northern Utah, both of which have capital facilities
plans and a properly adopted impact fee analysis even though they too give no
subdivision plat approvals or building permit approvals. R. 99-109 In lact the service
provided by Weber Basin is almost identical as that provided by the District, since the
primary operation of both is to provide wholesale culinary and secondary water to
municipalities.
Finally, the District itself considered the very fee in question to be an impact fee
prior to its July 17, 2001 meeting. In a letter to Toquerville, dated August 5, 1999, Ron
Thompson calls the District's culinary water fee — which is a pass through fee — an
"impact... fee[]," even though it is clear from his letter that Toquerville is collecting the
fee. R. 303, Tf 2. In his letter he expresses concern "that the Town has not implemented
the agreement h\ idopting the schedule of impact and other fees required by the
Agreement." Id. In a May 20, 2001 newspaper article, the District's manager stated that

the fee was an impact fee, and was intended to cover system improvements. R. 69-70.
The District also went to the expense in late May 2001, of producing a draft capital
facilities plan and impact fee analysis and of publishing notice of a public hearing on
June 12, 2001, to consider the same. R. 71-81. The District even drafted a proposed
Resolution for the District Board to adopt that would approve the capital facilities plan
and impact fee analysis. R. 81. Only after Keystone pointed out the significant
inadequacy of these studies did the District decide to forego the analysis process it is
required to perform by statute, and to twist the plain meaning of state law and claim for
the first time that its impact fee is not an impact fee.
The Trial Court found that the fee was an impact fee because in order for
Keystone to obtain water from the District, Keystone must pay the District a fee as a
condition of obtaining the District's written authorization to construct the secondary
water system on its property which is required by District rules. R. 193-194. However,
under Keystone's second argument, the Court found that the fee was not an impact fee
because the development approval under that argument was not by the district but was by
Toquerville City. R. 194-95. It is this second ruling that Keystone believes is not in
keeping with the statute and now appeals.
Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(7)(a) defines an impact fee as "a payment of money
imposed upon development activity as a condition of development approval." The term
"development approval" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(4) as "any written

authorization from a local political subdivision that authorizes the commencement of
development activity."4 Based on these definitions, the court stated in its Ruling of
January 15, 2002,
If Keystone's "development activity" is the subdivision generally, and if
Keystone must apply to the District for service because no other such
service is available and that service is a condition of Toquerville's approval
of Keystone's subdivision, the District's approval of Keystone's application
is a necessary predicate to Toquerville's approval of the subdivision but it
is not a "written authorization ... that authorizes the commencement of
development activity" and, therefore, the District's approval is not
"development approval." Even though, contrary to the District's argument,
the District's approval of an application for secondary water service does
affect the municipality's subdivision approval, it does not constitute
"development approval" which would make the District's availability fee
constitute an impact fee.
R. 194-95. In its ruling, the Court recognized that Toquerville's subdivision approval is
directly affected by and dependent upon an action of the District. However, the ruling
wrongly focuses on the District's approval of Keystone's application rather than on the
District's fee, and overlooks the use of the word "condition" in the statute. The statute
says an impact fee is "a payment of money imposed upon development activity as a

4

"Development Activity" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(3) as "any construction
or expansion of a building, structure, or use, any change in use of a building or structure, or
any changes in the use of land that creates additional demand and need for public facilities."
The term "public facilities" according to Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(11) includes "water
rights and water supply, treatment, and distribution facilities" which are "owned and
operated by or on behalf of a local political subdivision." The term "local political
subdivision" includes special districts such as the Washington County Water Conservancy
District. See Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-102(8).

condition of development approval." Utah Code Ann. § ll-36-102(7)(a)(emphasis
added). It makes no difference that the written authorization itself comes from one entity,
namely, Toquerville. The fact is Toquerville would not issue the authorization unless the
District's fee, "a necessary predicate to Toquerville's approval," is paid. R. 194. There
is no question that if Keystone obtains water from the District, a payment of money (the
District's fee) will then be imposed on Keystone's development activity. Neither is there
a question that Toquerville City has required payment of that fee as a condition of its
granting its own development approval. Hence, it is not the District's approval that is at
issue. The District's approval is not the one mentioned in the statute. Rather, it is the
City's approval, which is conditioned on the District's fee. Indeed, the Court correctly
assumed that Toquerville's approval is directly dependent upon payment of this fee. R.
194.
In short, the statute does not say that the development approval at issue must be
issued by the same governmental body that receives the fee. It only says that when a
development approval (regardless of whom this approval is from) is conditioned on a fee,
that fee is an impact fee. The statute must be interpreted according to its plain terms. See
Rehnv.Rehn, 974 P.2d 306, 311 (Utah App. 1999).
The Trial Court has suggested in note 3 of its Ruling that Keystone's interpretation
would also mean that a contractor's license fee or a business license fee is an impact fee
as well. R. 194 n. 3. Keystone disagrees with this analogy. First of all, payment for a

contractor's license is made to the State, not "a local political subdivision." Utah Code
Ann. § 11-36-102(4). More importantly, a contractor's license fee or business license fee
is only incidentally connected if at all to subdivision plat approval. Nothing in the law
requires that a developer be a licensed contractor or that he operate in the name of a
business rather than his individual name. On the other hand, it is plain that a developer
cannot get subdivision plat approval from Toquerville, for example, without culinary
water and without paying Toquerville the fee based upon "the schedule of impact and
other fees required by the agreement" with the District. R. 303; see also R. 237-256; R.
301, %2; R. 30-1 I Utimately, whether that fee goes to the District or someone else, it is
paid as a condition of development approval from a local political subdivision, and
therefore, it must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and its originators must comply with the
Impact Fee Act. An impact fee is "a payment of money imposed upon development
activity as a condition of development approval." Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(7)(a). A
contractor's license or business license is not "development activity" as that term is
defined in the statute.
At best, the Court's interpretation of the ordinance makes the definition of "impact
fee" ambiguous, requiring that we look at the intent of the drafters of this law. See
Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990). L. Alma Mansell, Blaine
Walker, iiul Greg Bell wne members of the drafting committee that drafted the Impact
Fee Act in 1995. Mr. Mansell is currently President of the Utah Senate and was the

sponsor of the Impact Fee Act before the legislature in 1995. R. 227-229. Mr. Walker
represented real estate interests, and Mr. Bell was a municipal representative on the
drafting committee. R. 233-235, 288-290. Their affidavits clearly state that it was the
intent of these individuals and the intent of the legislators that impact fees include those
fees that are required by one governmental entity that are in fact collected by another
governmental entity and which are made a condition of development approval by that
second governmental entity. The affidavits indicate that it would be contrary to the
legislative intent of the Impact Fee Act for a governmental entity to hide behind the skirts
of another governmental entity. R. 227-229, 233-235, 288-290. If, for example, a city
passed through and imposed fees from another governmental entity (such as a special
service district) as a condition of its own development approval, it would be contrary to
and defeat the purpose of the Impact Fee Act if the governmental entity that originated
the fee (the special service district) did not produce a capital facilities plan and analysis
as required by the Impact Fee Act to support that fee. The special service district could
simply name its price without any justification. See eg. R. 242. Such an arbitrary fee
violates this Court's holding in Banberry, 631 P.2d at 903-905. Indeed, that is why
special service districts were included in the definition of a "local political subdivision"
that is subject to the Act. It was the intent of the drafters and the intent of the legislature
that no impact fees should be imposed by any entity unless that entity thoroughly and
factually demonstrated the need for the fee through compliance with the Act.

There is another statutory example of how one governmental body can condition
development approval on the fee imposed by another governmental body. Utah Code
Ann. § 1 l-36-102(8)(b) states that a school district is not a "local political subdivision"
that can enact an impact fee, and that impact fees for schools are governed by Utah Code
Ann. § 53A-20-100.5. In turn, § 53A-20-100.5(l) says that a "school impact fee" is "a
charge on new development in order to generate revenue for funding or recouping the
costs of capital improvements for schools or school expansions necessitated by and
attributable to the new development." Subsection (2) further indicates that "there is a
moratorium prohibiting a county, city, town, local school board, or any other political
subdivision from imposing or collecting a school impact fee." (emphasis added) The
statement "imposing or collecting" is instructive, since it clearly indicates that any
governing body can collect an impact fee on behalf of another entity, namely, a school
board. The mere fact they are collecting it for another entity does not mean it is not an
impact fee. Indeed, there would be no sense to a school impact fee collected by a city or
county that was not given to the school district, since Utah Code Ann. § 53A-20-101
states that the school district is the entity empowered to use such funds for school capital
improvements.
Finally, it may be asked why this issue is of such great concern to Keystone even
though the Trial Court found the District's water availability fee was an impact fee on
other grounds. This is because the District could simply amend its rules to eliminate the

language the court relied on in its finding that the fee is an impact fee, and amend its
contracts with local cities to circumvent the Impact Fee Act. Indeed, the District is
already doing this in respect to culinary water. An example is found in the Water Supply
Agreement between the District and Toquerville City. R. 237-56. In paragraph 4 of this
agreement it is seen that the city must pay the district $1,500.00 for each new residential
connection for culinary water. R. 241-42. While the agreement says that this payment
occurs following approval of a plat or building permit, as a practical matter the city must
acquire this money from the developer before development approval is given, as a
condition of development approval. Indeed, Toquerville's subdivision ordinance requires
that all builders who are unable to provide their own culinary water "shall fund the efforts
of the town to successfully develop sufficient water to supply their needs. Water shall be
developed and development paid for by the subdivider before a preliminary plat is
approved." R. 270. Because the town has chosen to ''develop" its culinary water supply
by way of purchase from the Water District, the end result is that, under this ordinance,
the developer must pay the $1,500.00 fee as part of the city impact fees before he will
receive development approval. R. 269-70. Such a scenario, in fact, has already happened
to Calvin D. Lowe, a developer who developed a subdivision in Toquerville. R. 300-301.
Mr. Lowe was required to pay a $1,500.00 water fee on his 27 lots ($40,500.00) before
he could receive approval for the final plat of the subdivision. R. 301, Tf 2. Ronald
Thompson, the District's Manager, even called this fee an "impact...fee[]." R. 303.

While Toquerville charges this $1,500.00 fee along with its own impact fee as a
"pass through" fee that it collects for the District, in fact there is no impact fee analysis to
justify the culinary water fee of $1,500.00 since neither Toquerville nor the District has
prepared such an analysis for this fee. If questioned about the reasonableness of this
amount, Toquerville will simply point to its contract with the District who established the
fee—and the District has never justified the reasonableness of the fee in the manner
required by the Impact Fees Act. The public is left with no justification for the fee, while
two governmental entities simply claim that the other entity is responsible. This fee is
arbitrary and is not constitutional. Banberry, 631 P.2d at 905. It is feared that the
District will rearrange its affairs to do the same with secondary water, thereby
circumventing the Judgment in this case. Indeed, the District's confidence that it can
legitimately do this is increased by the Court's Judgment and Ruling, since the Ruling
states that such pass through fees are not impact fees subject to the Impact Fees Act.
B-

IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, ESPECIALLY
GIVEN THE BROAD REQUEST BY THE DISTRICT, THE TRIAL
COURT MAY ASSUME FACTS AND PROBABLY SCENARIOS;
ACCORDINGLY, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING
KEYSTONE'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT

In this matter, the District has requested declaratory relief "against all persons who
f a i l . . . to appear" and challenge the District's Petition. Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1442;
see also R. 213. The District sought declaratory relief that the "fees charged by the
District under the Rules are not impact fees under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq."

R. 4, TJ12. The District did not ask then to limit the scenarios in which such a finding
could be had. R. 222 n. 2. It cannot do so now.
From the outset of this case, Keystone argued that a pass through fee was a likely
scenario for the District and that such fee is an impact fee. Addendum No. 1, f 40 n. 7.
The District argued below that it does not sell water unless someone wants it; that the sale
of water is voluntary and is not a condition of development approval. It has no control of
what Toquerville requires as a condition of development approval. R. 220. Yet, the
"District's Petition prays for the Court to determine whether the District's final rules
impose impact fees, without reference to Keystone or any other particular applicant." Id.
Given the broad nature of the District's request, the Trial Court had to assume,
nonetheless, that "someone" would apply to the District for water. R. 221. The Trial
Court was correct in making that assumption.
Further, with respect to the second or pass through theory on impact fees,
Keystone presented evidence that the District does in fact collect its fees from
municipalities rather than charge the fees directly itself. The reality is that these fees are
paid as a condition of plat approval. R. 10, 30, 110, 111, 303, 304. Notwithstanding this
evidence in the record, this evidence need not be taken for the truth of the matter, but
rather to demonstrate the second scenario wherein the "fees charged by the District under
the Rules" are indeed impact fees even though they are collected by Toquerville. See R.
4,112. Given the declaratory nature of the District's request, this Court must assume

that the pass through theory is possible, and then conclude or declare that the fee set by
the District, even though collected by a municipality, is nonetheless an impact fee.
Keystone has gone through the plain language of the Impact Fee Act to show that
a pass through fee of the municipality is indeed an impact fee even though the District
itself does not approve the development activity. Keystone has explained the Trial
Court's errors in its analogizing the water user fee to a contractors or a business license
fee. Keystone has gone through the intent of those who drafted the Impact Fee Act.
Keystone has demonstrated that even the District's manager heretofore called pass
through fees "impact... fees." R. 303. Accordingly, and respectfully, the Trial Court
erred in failing to grant Keystone's Motion to Alter Judgment and in otherwise
concluding that the pass through fee would not be an impact fee. R. 223. This Court can
likewise assume the facts of a pass through fee and can so find that such fees are impact
fees when collected by a municipality as a condition of subdivision plat approval. This
Court should so find.
C.

KEYSTONE SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEYS FEES IN
THIS MATTER

As a final matter, Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401(5) provides that "reasonable
attorneys9 fees and costs [may be awarded] to the prevailing party in any action brought
under this section." Keystone has repeatedly requested that the Trial Court enter such an
award of attorney's fees and costs on its behalf. See Addendum No. 1, at 14; see also R.
206, 297-298.

Keystone was successful in bringing a Complaint against the District seeking a
ruling that the availability fee was an impact fee under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et
seq. See Addendum No. 1. Keystone was simultaneously successful in defending the
District's own Petition asking the Trial Court to declare that its availability fee was not an
impact fee "under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq." R. 4, ^ 12.
Moreover, the Trial Court's analysis in its Ruling was based on the Impact Fee
statute: "[T]he District's availability fee does constitute an impact fee under the Impact
Fees Act." R. 193-194. Accordingly, there is no reason why Keystone should not be
awarded its attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-401(5).
Municipalities and quasi-municipalities carry large sticks and can impose high
expense in the form of impact fees that affect small contractors, developers and
ultimately the home buyer. The legal cost of challenging municipalities and quasimunicipalities for impact fees can be cost prohibitive. If attorney's fees and costs are not
awarded to a property owner, contractor or developer who successfully challenges an
impact fee, the likelihood of future judicial review is not great. The result is that the
actions of the municipality or quasi-municipality are unchecked.
In the present case, the District initially called its availability fee an impact fee. It
attempted to publish notice and comply with the impact fee statute in connection with
passing that fee. Only when that fee was challenged by Keystone and other lot owners in
the Toquerville area did the District suspend its ruling in June and change its tune in July

such that its fee imposed was an "availability fee" and not an impact fee under the statute.
This kind of slight-of-hand should not be sanctioned. Keystone has spent considerable
time and resources getting the District to comply with the Utah Code and should be
awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for its efforts. The Utah State Legislature
clearly intended to allow the prevailing party to recover its attorneys' fees and costs in
such actions. If Keystone is not awarded its attorneys' fees and costs, one would be hard
pressed to find a case where such an award would be warranted, thus undermining the
express intent of the Utah State Legislature.
Keystone was clearly the prevailing party to both Keystone's Complaint and the
District's Petition brought under Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq. For this reason,
Keystone should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs in this case, and the Trial Court
abused its discretion in failing to make such an award. The Utah Supreme Court should
reverse and remand this matter to the Trial Court, instructing the Trial Court to award
Keystone reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, including fees and costs on appeal.
X.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the statutory definition of an impact fee includes fees imposed by a
governmental body even when a different governmental body places a condition on
development approval that brings about collection of the fee. This is the case here, since
the fees in question must be paid in order to satisfy the conditions on development
approval of Toquerville and LaVerkin. The Trial Court therefore erred in finding that the

District's pass through fee was not an impact fee. The District must comply with the
requirements of the Utah Impact Fee Act found in Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-101 et seq.
Failing to find in favor of Keystone has the potential to allow special districts and other
governmental agencies to circumvent the purpose of the Impact Fee Act.
The Impact Fee Act provides that the Court "may award reasonable attorney's fees
and costs to the prevailing party in any action brought under this section." Utah Code
Ann. § 11-36-401(5), and the Trial Court abused its discretion in failing to award
Keystone its attorney's fees and costs in successfully defending the District's Petition as
well as successfully bringing its own Complaint.
Finally, Keystone should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KEYSTONE CONVERSIONS, LLC, a Utah

COMPLAINT AND NOTICE

Limited Liability Company,

REQUESTING TRIAL

Plaintiff,
v.
The WASHINGTON COUNTY WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, an independent
special district of Washington County,

.
Civil No.:
Judge:

Defendant.
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Plaintiff Keystone Conversions LLC, by and through its counsel, the law office of Snow
Jensen & Reece, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1428(4) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, hereby complains against Defendant and gives notice of its request for trial as
follows:
1.

Plaintiff Keystone Conversions LLC ("Keystone") is a Utah Limited Liability

Company, which does business in Washington County, State of Utah, and which is the successor
in interest to C.F.H. Development Company, L.C., in respect to ownership of approximately 245
acres of subdivision property and approximately 400 acre feet of water rights in the LaVerkin

Creek Irrigation System located in the City of Toquerville, on the border with the City of
LaVerkin, and which may in the future come within the City of LaVerkin.
2.

Defendant Washington County Water Conservancy District is an independent

special service district in Washington County, Utah that is funded by tax dollars.
3.

This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4,

and venue is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1 and -4.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
4.

In mid May, 2001, Defendant announced it was planning to hold a public hearing

on June 12, 2001 regarding a newly proposed $3,000.00 per lot impact fee in the LaVerkin Creek
Irrigation System, the extent of which system was undefined, but which system is said to include
Plaintiffs property in Toquerville.
5.

Defendant's prior impact fee was $1,000.00 per lot. This fee had never been

established in the manner required by law, but has been enforced by Defendant and collected
from Plaintiff and its customers for several years.
6.

Plaintiff contacted Defendant requesting more information on the proposed

increased fee and on Defendant's capital facilities plan on which the proposed fee wras based.
7.

In spite of the fact that Defendant has existed since the 1960s, and has provided

culinary and secondary water throughout Washington County for which it has charged impact
fees since that time, it has never had a capital facilities plan on which to base any of the impact
fees it has ever charged as is specifically required by Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-201(2).
8.

Defendant subsequently produced a two page Draft Capital Facilities Plan (which

has not been approved) and a three page Impact Fee Analysis for the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation
System, both dated May 23, 2001.
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9.

The two page Draft Capital Facilities Plan was grossly inadequate because it did

not describe the significant capital facilities held by the Defendant all across Washington
County. The three page Impact Fee Analysis was grossly inadequate because it did not define
the geographic area to be covered by the fee, nor did it satisfy the criteria required of such an
analysis under the Utah Impact Fee Act.
10.

Copies of the Draft Capital Facilities Plan and Impact Fee Analysis were not

placed in the library fourteen days before the scheduled June 12, 2001 hearing on the impact fee
as is specifically required by Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-201.
11.

Defendant's proposed Impact Fee Analysis stated that system costs for the

LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System were $1,585,000.00. However, a 'System Costs Breakdown'
for the same system which was also issued by Defendant actually showed system costs to be
$1,347,287.93. In addition, a large amount of the claimed system costs even for this lesser
amount were for facilities that are principally intended to serve other systems that have their own
separate water rights and that rightfully and reasonably should be paid for by users of those other
systems.
12.

Defendant's Analysis failed to meet the numbered statutory criteria given in Utah

Code Ann. § 11-36-201(5) that all valid impact fees analysis' must contain in order to
substantiate a reasonable impact fee, including but not limited to an estimation of the
proportionate share of the costs of impacts on system improvements that is reasonably related to
the new development activity.
13.

Defendant's Analysis indicated that the potential service area of the undefined

LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System is 244 acres, which is almost identical to the acreage (245
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acres) owned by Plaintiff. It therefore appears that Defendants Analysis is targeted solely at
Plaintiff.
14.

However, the acreage that Defendant said could be serviced by the 1,465.55 acre

feet of water available in the residential secondary water system (244 acres) in the LaVerkin
Creek Irrigation System is unreasonable and in error, since it was arbitrarily calculated at the rate
of 6 acre feet per acre which is the highest flooded field agricultural rate.1 By comparison, the
agricultural sprinkler rate is 4 acre feet per acre, and St. George City uses a rate of 3 to 4 acre
feet per acre for golf courses. Since most of the 1,465.55 acre feet of water rights in the
LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System have been changed from agricultural to municipal use, the
actual rate that should apply in this system is even less. For example, the state only computes at
the rate of 1 lA acre feet per acre in residential secondary water systems, and studies by the Utah
Department of Natural Resources, Division of Water Resources, have shown that actual usage of
residential secondary water systems in the Washington County area is usually around 1 acre foot
per acre.2
15.

The parties are under a contractual agreement whereby Plaintiff generously sold

to Defendant certain valuable water rights (approximately 400 acre feet of the 1,465.55 in the
LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System) for a mere $300 per acre foot.3 In exchange, Defendant
guaranteed that those water rights shall "run with the lands," and committed to supply up to 270
acre feet of residential secondary water for Plaintiffs projects.

1

The calculation was made by dividing the acre feet of water available in the system, 1.465.55 acre feet, by 6, the
result being 244 acres.
2
It should be noted that this calculation includes only actual residential lots, rather than fully developed acres in
residential areas, whereas Defendant's calculation includes the entire acre regardless of how much of the acre is
developed as a residential lot. Obviously, the actual usage rate will be less than 1 acre foot per acre in residential
areas if whole acres—including roads and sidewalks—rather than just lots are considered.
3
One acre foot of water rights in LaVerkin City sells for $2,000 per acre foot.
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16.

Defendant is now attempting to evade its responsibilities under its contract with

Plaintiff by not passing on the water rights that were to "run with the land." Defendant now
states that Plaintiff must now apply to Toquervilie and/or LaVerkin for supply of its secondary
water before Defendant will honor its contractual obligations, and Defendant will only provide
the water it is contractually obligated to provide if these cities cannot do so. However, to obtain
secondary water from the LaVerkin Canal Company (which services LaVerkin City), Plaintiff
will be required to buy replacement water rights at the price of over $2,000 per acre foot. To
participate in the Toquervilie Secondary Water System (which services Toquervilie City),
Plaintiff will be required to pay a "new water user" impact/connection fee of $1,500 per XA acre
foot connection—even though other participants in this Toquervilie system who sold water to the
Defendant were given connections at greatly reduced rates!
17.

On June 12, 2001, Plaintiff submitted to Defendant objections to both the

Defendant's proposed capital facilities plan and impact fee analysis. Among other things, these
Objections described in detail how the Defendant's alleged system cost amount and 6 acre feet
per acre calculation were unreasonable and in error.
18.

Defendant's Board of Directors met on June 12, 2001 to review the proposed

capital facilities plan and impact fee analysis. The Board postponed final decision on whether to
approve the two plans until its July 17, 2001 meeting.
19.

Defendant did not publish in the newspaper any notice of its July 17, 2001

hearing, nor did it place in the library any revised copy of the Capital Facilities Plan or Impact
Fee Analysis prior to this hearing.
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20.

At the July 17, 2001 hearing, Defendant for the first time claimed that the

proposed fee for the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System was not an impact fee subject to the
impact fee statute at all, but was a "water availability fee" instead.
21.

A new document—not previously made available to the public—entitled

"LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System Availability, User & Standby Fee Analysis" (hereinafter
"Analysis") was passed out by Defendant at the July 17, 2001 hearing, which document listed
system costs at $1,347,288 (the lower amount mentioned in paragraph 11 above), and a fee of
$5,522 per developed acre, but which still listed the available acreage under the system at 244
acres, and in all other respects was obviously a mere redraft of Defendant's prior Impact Fee
Analysis.
22.

The system costs given in the new analysis were comprised of the following:

LaVerkin Creek Diversion & Pump station
Metering & flow control system
Pipe & fittings
50% of 20" pipeline from Davis Pond to 15" line
Engineering design & inspection
Water rights

$213,391
$ 14,122
$555,011
$113,950
$ 134,511
$316,303

Total

$1,347,288

23.

"

Many of the above listed costs on which the fee is based are unreasonable. For

example, the $113,950 for 50%) of the 20" pipeline from Davis Pond pertains to a pipeline for the
2,200 acre feet of water in the Toquerville City system, which is an entirely independent system
from the 1,465.55 acre feet of water rights in the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System. Although it
is possible for the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System to receive water from this line, it is
unreasonable for water users in the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System to pay for 50% of this line,
since far more than 50% of this line services an entirely different group if users; i.e., the City of
Toquerville.
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24.

The listed costs on which the fee is based are also unreasonable because at least

$218,280 of the amount for "pipe and fittings" was to pay for Defendant's installation of a new
18"+ line through LaVerkin at the time of the recent (in 2001) street improvements of LaVerkin
City. Although LaVerkin City already had an adequate line, this new large line was installed by
Defendant as a speculative measure, just in case the entire City of LaVerkin ever ceased having
its own water company and needed service from Defendant. This line was not needed to service
the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System and it is unfair and unreasonable for Defendant to try to
force Plaintiff and other water users in the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System to pay for this line
as part of their fee.4
25.

The listed cost of $134,511 for "Engineering design & inspection" is based on the

standard in the industry of 10% of the total system cost. Obviously, if other system costs are
adjusted to be more reasonable, this cost too will decline.
26.

Upon information and belief, the listed cost of $14,122 for "Metering and flow

control station" may be partially or wholly for the Toquerville City control station which
provides little if any service to users of the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System.
27.

Upon information and belief, a substantial portion of the listed cost of $213,391

for "LaVerkin Creek Diversion & Pump station" may be unreasonable because it may pertain to
costs not associated with the LaVerkin Creek diversion and pump station, but to other systems
paid for by Defendant.

4

It should also be noted that the 20" line through Toquerville and the 18"+ line through LaVerkin are far larger than
necessary to service future development. Even a 15" line is capable of carrying almost 20,000 acre feet of water per
year—yet Defendant admits that the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System has only 1.465.55 acre feetjMt appears that
these large lines were put in place by Defendant to satisfy its own agenda of potentially moving lapge quantities of
water across the county through connecting pipelines. Obviously, Plaintiffs and other water users in the LaVerkin
Creek Irrigation System should not be forced to pay for such unnecessarily large pipelines put in at the whim of the
Defendant.
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28.

Defendant's fee in the new analysis is also unreasonable because it still computes

the available acreage in the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System at the highest agricultural flood
rate of 6 acre feet per acre when in fact most of the wrater rights at issue have been changed to
municipal, residential use and, as stated above, residential secondary water systems in the
Washington County area usually use around 1 acre foot per acre.
29.

If the more reasonable water usage rate of 1 acre feet per acre were used by

Defendant, the 1,465.55 acre feet of water Defendant says is available in the LaVerkin Creek
Irrigation System would service 1,465.55 acres, rather than the 244 acres claimed by Defendant.
This means that, even if Defendants were correct in their alleged total system costs of
$1,347,288, the water availability fee would then be dramatically lower, since the fee is
calculated by dividing the system costs by the acreage in the potential service area, as seen
below:

Total System Cost
Potential Service area (acres)
Water availability Feet per acre
30.

at 6 acre feet per acre
$1,347,288.00
244
$5,522.00

at 1 acre foot per acre
$1,347,288.00
1,465.55
$919.00

Plaintiff estimates that total system costs, if reasonably and fairly calculated,

would be considerably lower, but in no event would they exceed $850,000.5 At this rate, the fee
should be as follows:
Total System Cost
Potential Service area (acres)
Water availability Feet per acre
31.

$850,000.00
1,465.55
$580.00

Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff pointed out the above regarding the

inaccurate cost figures and inaccurate rate of 6 acre feet per acre at the July 17, 2001, hearing,
Complaint

Defendant's Board approved the Analysis and its newly amended Rules and Regulations for
Secondary Retail Water Service for the LaVerkin Creek Area which included within it as Exhibit
A the water availability fee of $5,522 per developed acre described in the Analysis.6
32.

Defendant has required that if a subdivider elects to use Defendant's water, the

fees must be paid by the developer directly to Defendant in one single payment that includes all
proposed property in the subdivision (including streets and open areas, whether watered or not),
before the subdivider can be connected to the Defendant's system. Because the subdivision
ordinances of Toquerville City and LaVerkin City require that a secondary water system be in
place as a condition of subdivision plat approval, the developer is forced to pay Defendant's fee
as a condition of development approval.
33.

Defendant has acknowledged this fact because the last page of Defendant's

analysis issued on July 17, 2001 contains the recommendation that "a Water Availability Fee for
irrigation of $5,522 per developed acre should be assessed to all developments where service has
been committed before the final plat is recorded."
34.

In Plaintiffs case, this means that before Plaintiff can obtain plat approval for the

59 lots on approximately 40 acres in Phase II of its Cholla Creek subdivision (there are three
more phases to be developed after Phase II), it would need to pay Defendant $162,899.
35:

Defendant's standby fees are also excessive because they are based on the same

faulty bloated system costs and excessive and inaccurate water usage figures of 6 acre feet per
acre.

5

To date Plaintiff has been unable to obtain accurate cost figures from Defendant, and therefore is at present only
able to provide an estimate of system costs.
6
Paragraph 18 of these rules states that "rates, charges, and fees shall be reasonably related, to the extent possible, to
the cost of providing the service for which they are assessed." Paragraph 24 has a similar provision. As described
in this Complaint, the fees established by Defendant are not in keeping with its own rules because they are
unreasonable.
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Relief)
36.

The allegations in all other paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated herein

by reference.
37.

Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(7)(a) defines an impact fee as "a payment of money

imposed upon development activity as a condition of development approval."
38.

The subdivision ordinances of Toquerville City and LaVerkin City require that a

developer must provide a secondary water system in his subdivision before plat approval.
39.

The last page of the analysis which was approved by Defendant on July 17, 2001

stated that "a Water Availability Fee for irrigation of $5,522 per developed acre should be
assessed to all developments where service has been committed before the final plat is
recorded."
40.

Defendant's last minute effort to recharacterize its fee as a "water availability" fee

rather than an impact fee is illegal and unreasonable, since the fee clearly meets the definition in
the Utah Impact Fees Act as "payment of money imposed upon development activity as a
condition of development approval." Therefore Defendant is subject to all the provisions of said
act.7
41.

Defendant has failed to meet the requirements of the Utah Impact Fee Act

inasmuch as Defendant did not prepare or pass an adequate capital facilities plan, did not provide
adequate notice of the Impact Fee Analysis by publication and placing a copy of the same in the
library two weeks before it was passed, and further Defendant's Impact Fee Analysis has not

7

It should also be noted that prior to development approval many municipalities in the area charge as part of their
impact fees an amount directly based on the number of lots in the development that the City must pay Defendant to
obtain culinary water, which the municipalities then pass through directly to the Defendant. This practice also meets
the definition o f "payment of money imposed on development activity as a condition of development approval"
even though such fees have never been properly approved.
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meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-201(5) that the fee demonstrate how impacts
on system improvements are reasonably related to the development activity, and that the
proportionate share of the costs of impacts on system improvements are reasonably related to the
new development activity.
42.

More specifically, as was discussed above, Defendant's impact fee is

unreasonable, as well as arbitrary, capricious and illegal, for the following reasons:
a.

Many of the system costs identified by Defendant pertain to other systems

and cannot reasonably be charged to users of the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System. This
includes but is not limited to the charge for 50% of the 20" line to service the Toquerville
City system, and over $218,280 of the amount for pipe and fittings that was used by
Defendant to place a new speculative line through LaVerkin City that is not needed by
the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System.
b.

It computes secondary water usage in residential areas at the highest

agricultural flood rate of 6 acre feet per acre when in fact most of the water rights at issue
have been changed to municipal use, and the state calculates usage of residential
secondary water at the rate of 1 Vi acre feet per acre, and furthermore studies by the Utah
Department of Natural Resources, Division of Water Resources, have shown that usage
of residential secondary water systems in the Washington County area is usually 1 acre
foot per acre or less.
c.

It fails to meet the statutory criteria found in Utah Code Ann. § 11-36-

201(5) required of all impact fees, including an estimation of the impact on system
improvements that is reasonably related to new development activity.
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d.

There is no capital facilities plan on which to base such an analysis as is

specifically required by law, and the Draft Capital Facilities Plan Defendant previously
produced (which has not yet been approved by District) is grossly inadequate to satisfy
the requirements for a viable capital facilities plan.
e.

Proper notice of the July 17, 2001 hearing at which the fee was approved

was not published in the newspaper or placed at the library fourteen days in advance of
the hearing as is required by law.
43.

Because Defendant's fee is by its own admission "imposed upon development

activity as a condition of development approval," {See Utah Code Ann. § 1 l-36-102(7)(a)) this
Court should declare that Defendant's fee is an impact fee subject to the Utah Impact Fee Act.
Furthermore, because Defendant's impact fee for the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System of
$5,522 per developed acre is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and illegal for the reasons given
above, this Court should declare that it is not valid, and is in fact void and of no effect.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Failure to Satisfy Reasonable Fee Requirements)
44.

The allegations in all other paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated herein

by reference.
45.

Even if somehow Defendant's claim is valid that its fee as described above is not

an impact fee subject to the Utah Impact Fee Act, said fees still fail to meet the criteria required
of all water connection fees as specifically enumerated in Banberry DeveL Corp, v. South Jordan
City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981) that such a fee must be reasonable.
46.

Specifically, Banberry indicates that all water connection fees in Utah must be

reasonable and "must not require newly developed properties to bear more than their equitable
share of the capital costs in relation to benefits conferred." Banberry, supra, at 903.
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47.

Defendant's fee is not reasonable, as well as being arbitrary, capricious and

illegal, because it fails to meet the listed criteria in Banbeny for a reasonable fee, as follows:
a.

Many of the system costs identified by Defendant pertain to other systems

and cannot reasonably be charged to users of the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System. This
includes but is not limited to the charge for 50% of the 20" line to service the Toquerville
City system, and over $218,280 of the amount for pipe and fittings that was used by
Defendant to place a new speculative line through LaVerkin City that is not needed by
the LaVerkin Creek Irrigation System.
b.

It computes secondary water usage in residential areas at the highest

agricultural flood rate of 6 acre feet per acre when in fact most of the water rights at issue
have been changed to municipal use, and the state calculates usage of residential
secondary water at the rate of 1 Vi acre feet per acre, and furthermore studies by the Utah
Department of Natural Resources, Division of Water Resources, have shown that usage
of residential secondary water systems in the Washington County area is usually 1 acre
foot per acre or less.
c.

It fails to meet the criteria listed in Banbeny that are required of all impact

fees, including an estimation of the impact on system improvements that is reasonably
related to new development activity.
d.

Due process notice requirements were not met inasmuch as proper notice

of the July 17, 2001 hearing at which the fee was approved was not published in the
newspaper or provided to the public and interested parties in advance of the hearing as is
required by law.

Complaint

48.

Because Defendant's proposed connection fee is unreasonable, arbitrary,

capricious and illegal and has failed to meet the standards and.requirements for connection fees
under Utah law, this Court should declare that said connection fee is not valid, and is in fact void
and of no effect.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays for relief as follows:
1.

For a declaration that Defendant's fee is an impact fee subject to the Utah Impact

Fee Act, and that because said fee has failed to meet the requirements in said act and used
unreasonable and grossly inflated numbers and calculations and was inaccurate in other ways, it
is not valid, and is in fact void and of no effect;
2.

For a declaration that, even if Defendant was somehow correct in its assertion

that its fee is not an impact fee, Defendant has still failed to meet the legal requirement that all
connection and standby fees be reasonable, and that said fees are not valid, and are in fact void
and of no effect because they are unreasonable and are based on grossly inflated numbers and
other inaccuracies;
3.

In the alternative, the Court should order that Defendant return all water rights

and easements it obtained from Plaintiff in order to allow Plaintiff to install its own independent
secondary water distribution system;
4. -

For an award of attorney's fees as allowed by law; and

5.

For such other and further relief as the above Court deems equitable and proper.

DATED this / L ^%ay of August, 2001.

t

SNOW/JENSEN & REECE

L£\ps P. Reece
j
/Duane L. Ostler
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Plaintiffs Address:
Keystone Conversion, LLC
P.O. Box 213
Washington, UT 84780
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